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Abstract
In recent years, data privacy has become a major concern for data owners who share
information on private databases. In order to deal with this issue, data owners employ var-
ious mitigation strategies including disclosing partial information on datasets (i.e., mean,
median, histograms) or obfuscating the private attributes in a way that keeps a balance
between data privacy and utility. However, such methods have failed to preserve privacy
under certain adversary models. As an example, distance preserving transforms are found
to be vulnerable to attacks in which adversary has access to few known records in the
database.
In this work, we similarly analyze the privacy implications of rank publication of data
records based on the output of a ranking function. While much research has gone in the
design of a ranking function, analyzing privacy issues of database rankings is still a novel
problem. Many real world website reveal ranking of data records assuming that ranking
itself is not privacy sensitive. Examples of such rankings are evaluations of universities,
jobs, bank credit applications and hospital statistics on various categories. Our work
shows that seemingly naive information about rankings can cause severe privacy leakages.
In particular, we show that an adversary with a few known samples from the private
data can infer about the actual attributes of an unknown record by utilizing the ranking
information.
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O¨zet
Son yıllarda, veri gizlilig˘i, o¨zel veritabanları hakkında bilgi paylas¸an veri sahipleri
ic¸in bu¨yu¨k bir endis¸e haline gelmis¸tir. Bu konuyla ilgilenmek ic¸in, veri sahipleri veri
ku¨meleri hakkında kısmi bilgilerin (yani, medyan, histogramlar) ifs¸a edilmesi veya o¨zel
niteliklerin veri gizlilig˘i ile fayda arasında dengeyi koruyacak s¸ekilde gizlenmesi gibi
c¸es¸itli etki azaltma stratejileri kullanır. Bununla birlikte, bu gibi yo¨ntemler, bazı olumsuz
modellerde gizlilig˘in korunmasında bas¸arısız olmus¸tur. O¨rnek olarak, mesafe koruma
do¨nu¨s¸u¨mlerinin, ko¨tu¨ niyetli bir kis¸inin veritabanındaki bilinen birkac¸ kayda eris¸ebileceg˘i
saldırılara kars¸ı savunmasız oldug˘u go¨sterilmis¸tir.
Bu c¸alıs¸mada, benzer s¸ekilde bir sıralama fonksiyonunun c¸ıktısına dayanarak veri
kayıtlarının sıralı yayınlarının gizlilik etkilerini analiz ettik. Sıralama fonksiyonlarının
tasarımında birc¸ok aras¸tırma yapılmasına rag˘men, veritabanı sıralamasının gizlilik konu-
larını analiz etmek halen u¨zerinde c¸alıs¸ılmamıs¸ bir alandır. Birc¸ok gerc¸ek du¨nya web
sitesi, sıralamanın kendisinin mahremiyete duyarlı olmadıg˘ı varsayılarak veri kayıtlarının
sıralamasını yayınlamaktadır. Bu sıralamalara o¨rnek olarak u¨niversite, is¸, banka kredisi
bas¸vuruları ve hastane istatistiklerinin c¸es¸itli kategorilerdeki deg˘erlendirmeleri verilebilir.
Bu c¸alıs¸mada, sıralamalarla ilgili sorunsuz go¨ru¨nen bilgilerin ciddi gizlilik sızıntılarına
neden olabileceg˘ini go¨sterilmektedir. O¨zellikle, o¨zel verilerden birkac¸ bilinen o¨rneg˘e
sahip bir rakibin, sıralama bilgisini kullanarak bilinmeyen bir kaydın gerc¸ek o¨zellikleri
hakkında c¸ıkarım yapabileceg˘ini go¨steriyoruz.
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Chapter 1
Introduction
Data privacy has always been a major concern when dealing with applications that
share information on private databases. Data privacy advocates urge that data processing
techniques may reveal sensitive information, if applied directly on original data. To ad-
dress this problem, one basic solution has been to limit sharing by only disclosing partial
information on the dataset. Partial information can be in the form of statistics (e.g., mean,
median, histograms) or an output of a obfuscating function (e.g., distances between en-
tries). However, it has been previously shown that, such partial information may also be
used to violate privacy of data owners under certain adversary models. As an example,
distance preserving transformations (DPT) [1] are vulnerable to known sample attacks in
which the adversaries know the exact attributes of several points in the dataset [2–4].
In this work, we propose a similar privacy analysis on the sharing of ranking. We show
that transformations that preserve ranking or any statistics inferring ranking are vulnerable
to known sample attacks. Ranking in our domain is the ordering of the multidimensional
data records with respect to the output of any given function. Many real-world websites
disclose ranking of data records, assuming that ranking by itself is not privacy-sensitive.
For instance, universities publish entrance merit list by evaluating student’s credentials
such as GPA, entrance exam result and recommendation letters. Ranking function in
this case is a simple weighted average of various application components. Another real
incident that attracted much criticism happened when the New York City Education De-
partment published individual performance rankings of 18,000 public school teachers [5].
The rankings were calculated based on students’ performance on official exams over a five
year period.
The traditional belief has been that ranking information alone is not sufficient to
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breach data owner’s privacy, however, our analysis unveils that this seemingly naive in-
formation can cause severe privacy leakages. In particular, we show that an adversary
with a few known samples from the private data can learn about the actual attributes of an
unknown record by utilizing the ranking information.
1.1 Thesis Motivation
Consider a real world application of our attack. The Consumer Assessment of Health-
care Providers and Systems (CAHPS) analyze patients feedback on hospital-care using
standardized measurements that allow an effective comparison to be made between hospi-
tals [6]. Hospitals use this data to identify the areas which require quality improvements.
Moreover, US news publishes the hospital ranking lists [7], based on these standardized
measurements, such as ’best hospitals by specialty’, ’best hospitals by procedures’ and
’best children hospitals’ to name a few. Consider the following example: Table 1.1(a)
shows a private dataset of eight hospitals containing the rating in four domains namely
resources, expert opinion, mortality rate and patient safety.
The ranking function, denoted by F , is based on a weighted average function with
each attribute having an equal weight. Table 1.1(b) demonstrates the sorted ranking func-
tion values generated for the hospitals in Table 1.1(a). As an example, ranking func-
tion for Northwestern Hospital (NH) can be expressed by the equation: F(NH) =
(0.25 × 41.5) + (0.25 × 34.4) + (0.25 × 41.2) + (0.25 × 47.3). After evaluating the
expression, we get a value of F(NH) = 41.1. We use these values to generate our rank
publication dataset as shown in table 1.1(c). Note that this dataset is available publicly to
all the hospitals. Ranking shows that Michigan Medicine is placed at the top owing to the
highest value of F , whereas, Northwestern Hospital is ranked eighth in the list.
Consider the following scenario in which our attack can be employed. Three hospitals
from table 1.1(a), Cleveland Clinic, Northwestern Hospital and New York Hospital form
an alliance to improve the health-care facilities available to their patients. They central-
ize their databases such that these hospitals have access to each others private data. An
attacker from Northwestern Hospital has access to this data and this constitutes his set of
known records. The aim of the attacker is then to infer about private attributes of Johns
Hopkins Hospital, since, he can’t observe them directly due to lack of privileges. The
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attacker utilizes the set of known records and the rank publication data in table 1.1(a) to
formulate an attack on private attributes of Johns Hopkins Hospital.
By using this information only, the attacker efficiently estimates the private attribute
values for Johns Hopkins Hospital. Our attack, with only three known records, is able
to retrieve attributes: resources, expert opinion, mortality rate and patient safety with an
error of 0.5, 5.1, 0.3 and 2.7, respectively.
Table 1.1: Hospital assessment data-set, ranking function and released rankings.
Name Resources Expert opinion Mortality score Patient safety
Cleveland Clinic 50.5 43.9 41.1 48.0
Michigan Medicine 99.6 88.5 89.4 98.7
Northwestern Hospital 41.5 34.4 41.2 47.3
Mayo Clinic 81.1 89.8 73.3 81.3
Special Surgery Hospital 61.6 72.4 64.9 59.5
Johns Hopkins Hospital 44.3 51.1 43.4 46.5
NewYork Hospital 65.3 75.7 63.6 72.3
Massachusetts Hospital 83.1 92.6 95.8 98.5
(a) Private database D with eight records
F
94.0
92.5
81.3
69.2
64.6
46.3
45.8
41.1
(b)
Ranking
function
of hos-
pitals
Name
Michigan Medicine
Massachusetts Hospital
Mayo Clinic
NewYork Hospital
Special Surgery Hospital
Johns Hopkins Hospital
Cleveland Clinic
Northwestern Hospital
(c) Published ranking of hos-
pitals
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1.2 Thesis Contribution
In this work, we introduce a known sample attack on rankings. That is, an attacker
has a copy of published ranking of all records in a database along with a small set of
known samples belonging to the same database. The adversary runs our attack algorithm
using this information and infers about each private attribute value of all the records in
the database (i.e., excluding the known ones).
The salient features of our attack can be summarized as follows: (1) We treat an
attack on ranking as a noisy case of an attack on pairwise euclidean distance relations.
That is, we reduce our problem to another sub-problem that we solve in Euclidean space.
(2) Our attack only relies on a set of known records and ranks, without requiring any
prior information about data distribution. (3) In order to deal with high dimensional data,
we develop an efficient index structure to increase the efficiency of the attack. (4) We
predict the noise parameter using only the set of known samples, which in turn helps us
apply the attack on ranks. Moreover, for the sake of making the attack resilient to noise,
we introduce a voting mechanism. (5) To demonstrate the effectiveness of our attack,
we run the algorithm on real and synthetic data-sets. (6) We introduce a special metric,
namely expected distance, to measure per dimension and overall distance between the
estimated and actual records. Experiments show that our attack algorithm significantly
reduce the expected distance, when there is moderate to low noise introduced by the
ranking function.
4
Chapter 2
Preliminaries and Background
Information
In the rest of the thesis, we use the following notations, unless otherwise stated. The
data owner has a private database represented byD(r1, ..., rn), where each ri ∈ D denotes
one record. Each record has m + 1 attributes, where A1, ..., Am are the private attributes
and B1 is the public attribute. We use the notation r[Ai] or r[B1] to refer to a private or
public attribute of a record. We assume that the domain of each attribute Ω(A) or Ω(B) is
well-defined. For the example in Table 2.1, Name is a public attribute, whereas midterm
and final are private attributes, and Ω(Final) is the set of integers between 0 − 100. In
addition to that, we treat each record ri as a point in Euclidean space, and thus use point
and record interchangeably.
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Table 2.1: Students private data-set and released rankings.
Name Midterm Final GPA
alice 72 48 57.6
bob 40 27 32.2
carol 68 63 65
craig 95 81 86.6
dave 22 7 13
eve 44 40 41.6
frank 94 67 77.8
pat 53 47 49.4
(a) Private database D with eight records
Name
craig
frank
carol
alice
pat
eve
bob
dave
(b) Rank-
ings of
student
based on
GPA
2.1 Rankings
A ranking functionF : Rm → R takes as input a record and produces a score. Records
are ranked in decreasing order of their scores. Our attack is generic, and assumes no
knowledge of the ranking function F or the output scores. However, to have a meaningful
attack, we must assume F satisfies the following properties:
1. Inclusiveness: The private attribute we are trying to infer plays a role in the ranking
function and has impact on score. Otherwise, if the attribute is completely uncor-
related or unrelated to the score, we cannot predict its value from rankings or even
from raw scores.
2. Transitivity: Say that we have 3 records r1, r2, r3 for which F(r1) < F(r2) and
F(r2) < F(r3). Then, it must hold that F(r1) < F(r3).
3. Monotonicity: For the 3 records F(r1) < F(r2) < F(r3), say that r1[C] < r2[C]
where C is an attribute impacting score, and for all attributes D other than C,
r1[D] = r2[D] = r3[D]. Then, it must hold that r2[C] < r3[C], and by transitivity,
r1[C] < r3[C].
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Inclusiveness ensures that the private attributes we are trying to infer have non-zero cor-
relation with rankings; our experiments confirm the intuition that higher the correlation,
more successful our inference attack will be. Transitivity ensures that records’ final rank-
ing constitutes a total order. Monotonicity ensures that F behaves the same way for each
pair of values across the whole domain, e.g., it is not a piecewise function with undefined
regions, or it does not maintain order for some values but reverse order for others.
An example ranking function F that satisfies the above conditions and is a popular
choice in the database ranking literature is the linear function [8–10]:
F(r) =
m∑
i=1
wAi · r[Ai] (2.1)
where wi ∈ (0, 1] are the weights assigned to each attribute. We use this linear F in our
running examples throughout the thesis, but our attack does not need to assume a linear
F .
As an example, the function F , denoted by GPA in table 2.1a, is expressed asGPA =
0.4×midterm+0.6×final, where midterm and final are private attributes with weights
0.4 and 0.6, respectively. Alice and craig scored a GPA of 57.6 and 86.6, respectively,
and since craig has a higher GPA then alice, craig is assigned a higher rank in table 2.1b.
2.2 Geometric Perspective
The technical details of our attack are best explained with the help of geometric prop-
erties and visualizations. We therefore devote this section to introduce relevant geometric
primitives and definitions.
2.2.1 Euclidean Distance
Recall that our database D has m private attributes. This database can be equally
represented using an m dimensional space resulting from the Cartesian product: Ω(A1)×
Ω(A2) × ... × Ω(Am). Each record ri ∈ D translates to a point in this high-dimensional
space. In the remainder of the thesis, we use record and point interchangeably. The
distance between two points ri, rj is denoted by δ(ri, rj). Without loss of generality, we
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use Euclidean distance defined formally as follows:
δ(ri, rj) =
√√√√ m∑
k=1
(ri[Ak]− rj[Ak])2
2.2.2 Distance Matrix
The Distance matrix of a database D(r1, ..., rn) contains pairwise distance between
the data points in D. It is a n× n, real-valued and symmetric matrix A, such that Ai,j =
Aj,i = δ(ri, rj).
For example, let the student database D contain marks achieved in midterm and final
exam, as shown in table 2.1a. We calculate the distance between the first two records
which corresponds to A1,2 in the distance matrix: A1,2 = δ(r1, r2) =√
(72− 40)2 + (48− 27)2 = 38.27
2.2.3 Hypersphere and Hyperball
Next, we introduce geometric objects in d-dimensional space Rd, where d ≥ 2. A
hypersphere SC,ρ is defined using a center point C ∈ Rd and a radius ρ, and denotes the
collection of points in the d-dimensional space that are at distance ρ from C. That is, each
point r located on SC,ρ satisfies: ρ = δ(r, C). Given a hypersphere SC,ρ, the hyperball
BC,ρ denotes the space enclosed by SC,ρ. Hyperball BC,ρ is said to be closed if it includes
SC,ρ and open otherwise.
2.2.4 Hyperplane and Half-space
Let r1, r2 be two points in Rd. The collection of points equidistant to these two
points is a hyperplane Hr1r2 , such that all points r on this hyperplane satisfy the property
δ(r1, r) = δ(r2, r). We call such a hyperplane an equidistant hyperplane. A hyperplane
divides Rd into two portions called half-spaces. A half-space is said to be closed if it
includes the hyperplane, and open otherwise. In the case of an equidistant hyperplane, it
is clear to see that exactly one of the half-spaces will contain the first point r1, and the
other half-space will contain the second point r2. We refer to these half-spaces as Pr1 and
Pr2 respectively.
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In 2-dimensional space R2, a hyperspere is a circle, a hyperplane is a line, and the two
half-spaces are those regions that are on either sides of the line.
2.2.5 Relation Function
Given an arbitrary set of records r1, r2, r3, r4 ∈ D and their corresponding ranks
R1,R2,R3,R4, then relation function is given by:
Fλ((r1, r2), (r3, r4)) =

−1 if λ(r1, r2) < λ(r3, r4)
0 if λ(r1, r2) = λ(r3, r4)
1 if λ(r1, r2) > λ(r3, r4)
Where the function λ(ri, rj) ∈ {γ(ri, rj), ψ(ri, rj)}; ∀i, j = 1, 2, . . . , n and i 6= j.
Relation function Fλ keeps a track of the pairwise relation of the records with respect
to their euclidean distances and their ranks. We refer to the rank relations and euclidean
distance relations using the notation Fγ and Fψ, respectively.
For Fγ the function γ(ri, rj) = |Ri − Rj|, where |.| denotes the absolute value. On
the other hand, for Fψ the function ψ(ri, rj) = δ(ri, rj). Later, we utilize the relation
functions to design our attack on rankings.
9
Chapter 3
Related Work
In this chapter, we survey various attacks on DPTs and rank publication in the litera-
ture.
3.1 Attacks on DPTs
DPTs allow meaningful data-mining models to be formed which have a similar quality
as that formed by the original data. Due to this reason DPTs have gained significant at-
tention [1, 11–14]. In order to uncover vulnerabilities of DPTs, various attack techniques
have been developed to infer about private data [2–4, 8, 15–17]. For a detailed survey,
we refer readers to [18]. In [2], Liu et al. proposes two kind of attacks on DPTs where
attacker has some prior knowledge about the data. First is the known input-output pair
attack, in this case, the attacker has access to some private data records and their corre-
spondences to transformed records. Attacker can infer about transformation function by
using linear algebra techniques. This attack makes a strong assumption about the amount
of information known to the attacker, hence making it infeasible for practical application.
Second is the known sample attack where the attacker has access to a collection of data
records drawn from a similar distribution as the private data. In this case, principal com-
ponent analysis is employed to learn about the original data. The only drawback of this
approach is that it requires significantly large amount of known samples (e.g., 10% of the
original data) to accurately estimate original data.
In [3], Guo et al. adopts an Independent Component Analysis (ICA) based technique
to reconstruct the original data by assuming that the attacker has a set of known samples.
However, their approach requires large amount of known samples (e.g., 500-1000) to re-
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cover the original data. Furthermore, they don’t provide a metric to measure the accuracy
of reconstructed data. Chen et al. [15] formulates an attack assuming that the attacker has
prior knowledge about a sample of input-output pairs. Moreover, they also assume that
the number of linearly independent known samples are no less then data dimensions. For
the sake of private data estimation, they propose an approach based on linear regression.
In [16], Turgay et al. extends the known sample attack in [2] by assuming that a
distance matrix is available to the attacker. They propose an attack based on principle
component analysis and presume that the attacker has information about underlying data
distribution. Giannella et al. [4] develops a known sample attack without having any con-
straints on the number of known samples. Their approach is probabilistic, which means
that the location of reconstructed record cannot be identified with 100% confidence.
All the work mentioned in this section assumes that the exact (or noisy) distances
between the entities are revealed. However, using only the rankings, which is the fo-
cus of this work, such distances cannot be computed. Thus, our problem definition and
methodology in this work is significantly different from all the aforementioned works.
3.2 Attacks on RPTs and rank publication
More recently, Kaplan et al. [17] propose a Known sample attack on RPTs for two
dimensional data. They base the attack on geometric methods assuming that relation
retrieval function is available to the attacker. While we focus on a fundamentally different
problem, the method we follow in this work is similar to their approach, however, it
cannot be readily applied in our domain for two reasons. First, the computational and
space complexity of the previously proposed attack are both exponential in the number
of dimensions, thus cannot handle high-dimensional real datasets. Second, the type of
noise we require is fundamentally different from their approach. Instead of employing
Gaussian noise, we adopt a randomized response model that allows us to better predict
noise parameters which in turn gives us a good approximation for the attack on ranks.
In [8], Rahman et al. base their attack on a kNN query interface over a database by uti-
lizing the rank information of records. They divide the problem space in two dimensions:
the type of query (i.e., point or range) and adversary’s potential (i.e., insertion possible or
not). For each problem subspace, inference is derived by observing the change in ranks
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after initializing a sequence of queries. Experimental results show that they recover target
record, in most cases, with high success rate. However, the number of queries required
for such disclosure is high. For example, a record with 10 public attribute requires 400-
700 queries to be made. In our domain, we assume only one ranking dataset is released
and adversary has no way of changing the attributes of the participants, thus issuing cus-
tom queries is not possible which in turn makes our attack much harder. Furthermore,
they assume that all the attributes are discrete which is a relaxed constraint, since most
real-world data contain numerical values.
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Chapter 4
Methodology and Problem Definition
4.1 Attack Scenario
Our attack is conducted in the following setting. A ranking is publicly available but
without aggregate scores or individual attribute values. Examples of such rankings are
evaluation results of university, job and bank credit applications, hospital statistics, and
so forth. The adversary has a copy of this ranking along with a small set of known
samples whose records are part of the ranking, e.g., the adversary knows the attributes of
himself and a few close friends who applied to the same university. The adversary runs
our attack with the public ranking and his known sample set. After the attack finishes, the
adversary will infer each private attribute value of remaining individuals (who are not part
of his known samples) with small error and high confidence. Next, we give brief formal
descriptions for each step.
Rank Publication. The private database D(r1, ..., rn) containing raw records and private
attributes is stored safely and never released due to its sensitive content. A ranking is
computed by applying the function F(ri) on each record, and then sorting the records
according to their scores F(r1),F(r2), ...,F(rn) in decreasing order. This ranking is
made publicly available.
Adversarial Knowledge. The adversary only needs the following pieces of information
to conduct the attack:
1. The published rankings.
2. A set of known samples denoted K = {r1, r2, ...}. For all records rt ∈ K, the
adversary already knows their attribute values, i.e., rt[Ai] and rt[Bj] are known
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across all private attributes Ai and public attributes Bj .
Known sample attacks are popular in the literature [2, 4, 16, 17, 19]. Typically, our
attack requires the adversary to have only 5 − 10 known samples which is a realistic as-
sumption, contrary to some previous works requiring tens or hundreds of known records.
For example, the adversary himself and a few close friends could be part of the rankings,
or the adversary may be able to inject a few records to D (similar to a machine learning
poisoning attack).
What does the adversary not know? The adversary need not have the following infor-
mation, making the attack more plausible and realistic:
1. Knowledge of how the scoring function F works. For example, the weights wAi ,
wBj are not known by the adversary. In university, job, or bank credit applications,
the definition of F is often proprietary and not disclosed to the public.
2. The output score F(ri) of any record. If the adversary had the output scores of
his known samples, this could allow him to reverse-engineer or make inferences
regarding the definition and weights of F , making an attack easier. However, we
do not need to assume this.
We make the above conservative assumptions to build a widely applicable attack.
Clearly, our approaches still work if an adversary knows the above. We expect that if
the above were indeed known by the adversary, potential attacks could be faster and even
more effective.
Computational Requirements. The attack is typically not executed in real-time, and
therefore there are no strict efficiency requirements. We can assume the adversary runs
the attack offline with sufficient computational resources. Nevertheless, the attack should
conclude in a reasonable amount of time. For example, even if a person’s job or bank
credit application details may not change within a few minutes, they could change over a
few days or weeks, which implies the private attributes (and consequently, the rankings)
may change over time. Hence, we will introduce methods for time and space efficiency
in Section 4.4 to ensure our attack completes in a short period of time using a commodity
laptop.
Attack Output: Private Attribute Inference. The private attribute inference problem
can be stated formally as: Given a set of known samples K, the published rankings, and
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a target record rE /∈ K; what is the value of rE[Ai] where Ai is a private attribute?
Our attack is for answering the above question. Clearly, private attribute inference can
be repeated for many target records. In our experiments, we typically run the attack over
5 unknown records rE ∈ D \K, and report the average results.
4.2 Attack in euclidean space
Our objective is to discover actual attributes of an unknown record rE given a set of
known records K and their respective ranks. We reduce this problem to a problem that
we can solve in Euclidean space. Specifically, we first consider, in this sub-section, a sub-
problem in which an adversary has access to K and the outputs of Fψ on all quadruples
in K+ rE and tries to discover rE . This sub-problem is partially addressed in [17] but the
proposed solution cannot readily be applied in our domain. We later extend this problem
to the case in which the outputs of Fψ are noisy and the noise follows a randomized
response model. We explain how the complete reduction works in later sections.
4.2.1 An illustrative example
Our attack includes operations with hyperspheres and hyperplanes in continuous Rn
euclidean space. Since these operations are non-trivial to implement, we discretize the
data space into grids as shown in figure 4.1. We assume that the data space is made up
of equal sized n-dimensional grids. Decreasing the size of the grids would mean a finer
granularity and hence, an increase in the number of grids in the data space.
We start by giving an illustrative example of our attack in 2-dimensions. Consider
a database D with only two private attributes A1 and A2, where each record ri ∈ R2.
An attacker has access to two known samples rA and rB, which forms the set K. Let the
distance matrix of the records in D be represented by M . Then, the aim of the attacker is
to locate the target record rE in D.
Observation 1. If Fψ((rA, rE), (rB, rE)) = −1 then rE must be located in half-space
PrA .
Proof. By the definition of Fψ, we have δ((rA), (rE)) < δ((rB), (rE)). The hyperplane
HrArB has a property that it contains all the points equidistant to rA and rB. All the
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pointsX ∈ PrA , satisfy the inequality δ((rA), (X)) < δ((rB), (X)), while points Y inPrB
satisfy the inequality δ((rA), (B)) > δ((rB), (B)) and the points Z on HrArB satisfy
δ((rA), (Z)) = δ((rB), (Z)). Thus, rE is in PrA .
Observation 2. If Fψ((rA, rE), (rB, rE)) = 1, then rE must be located in half-space PrB .
Observation 3. If Fψ((rA, rE), (rB, rE)) = 0 then rE must be located on hyperplane
HrArB .
Proofs of observations 2 and 3 follow trivially from observation one hence, we skip
their proofs. Using the two known samples we generates a hyperplane HrArB which
contains a collection of points that are equidistant to rA and rB. The main idea then is to
examine the distance between the two known points and the target rE (i.e. δ((rA, rE)) and
δ((rB, rE))). Based on this relation, we iteratively prune the data space while searching
for rE . This process can be repeated for all the unique pair of known samples.
As an example, consider the distance matrix in figure 4.1. As the distance δ((rA, rE)) =
6 is less then δ((rB, rE)) = 7.07 thus, Fψ((rA, rE), (rB, rE)) = −1. The attacker draws
a hyperplane HrArB and finds out that rE is closer to rA as compared to rB. He concludes
that rE ∈ PrA and prunes PrB .
Observation 4. If Fψ((rA, rB), (rA, rE)) = −1, then rE must be located outside the
hypersphere SrA,δ(rA,rB).
Proof. By the definition of Fψ, we have δ((rA), (rB)) < δ((rA), (rE)). The hypersphere
SrA,δ(rA,rB) contains an infinite collection of points X located inside or on its surface that
satisfy the property δ((rA), (X)) <= δ((rA), (rB)). It follows that rE must be located
outside the hypersphere.
Observation 5. If Fψ((rA, rB), (rA, rE)) = 1, then rE must be located within the area
enclosed by the hypersphere SrA,δ(rA,rB).
Observation 6. If Fψ((rA, rB), (rA, rE)) = 0, then rE must be located on the hyper-
sphere SrA,δ(rA,rB).
The second type of observations (i.e. obs. 4,5 and 6) include creating a hypersphere
in n-dimensional data space. We skip the proofs for observation 5 and 6 since, they
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Figure 4.1: Discretized data space of D containing three records in R2. Actual location of
three records (on the left) and distance matrix of these records (on the right).
are similar to proof of observation 4. Given the two known samples rA and rB, the
attacker creates a hypersphere SrA,δ(rA,rB) centered at rA with a radius of δ(rA, rB). He
compares the distances δ(rA, rB) and δ(rA, rE) and infers the location of rE . Based on
this observation, he prunes the region that cannot contain rE . The same procedure can be
followed for the hypersphere SrB ,δ(rA,rB) however, in this case attacker needs to make a
comparison between δ(rA, rB) and δ(rB, rE). Again, these observations are applicable to
all unique pair of known samples.
We demonstrate these observations in figure 4.1. Since δ(rA, rB) = 2 is less than
δ(rA, rE) = 6, we have Fψ((rA, rB), (rA, rE)) = −1. The attacker creates a circle with
center rA and radius δ(rA, rB). He infers that rE must be located outside of this circle as
rE is farther away from rA than rB. Similarly, he creates a second circle centered at rB
with a radius of δ(rA, rB). Now, since δ(rB, rE) = 7.07 is greater than δ(rA, rB) = 2,
using the similar reasoning, the attacker deduces that rE is located outside this circle.
For all the unique pair of known samples, We prune the grids that don’t contain rE .
Note that we use a defensive approach here, that is we prune only when a grid can be
completely pruned from the search space. For example, in figure 4.1 we prune only the
grids that lie completely inside the half-space PrB . The naive approach of testing if a
grid completely resides in the half-space is to check for every corner, if the corner point
is located in the half-space. If at least one corner does not reside in the half space, we
do not prune the grid to eliminate the possibility of over-pruning. For instance, we avoid
over-pruning by not removing grid V from the search space because half of it is located
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in PrA and this region may also contain rE . By pruning grid V , we would violate the
correctness of our algorithm since left portion of this grid lies in PrA . On the other hand,
by not pruning V we are also keeping the region of this grid that is contained in PrB
which otherwise would have been pruned if we didn’t discretize the search space.
The number of corners of a grid in m-dimensional space is 2m. Thus, checking if
every corner of the grid resides in a given half-space is not efficient for high dimensional
data. We address this problem along with the formalization of the attack in the next
section.
4.2.2 Attack Formalization and Optimization
In this section, we explain our attack in m-dimensional space Rm and present a novel
and efficient technique to locate a grid with respect to a hypersphere or a hyperplane.
We propose our attack methodology in algorithm 1. The universe U represents all the
possible values that the private attribute of a record r[Aj] may have. The boundary of U
is defined by the domain of private attributes given by Ω(A). We don’t utilize the public
attributes in our attack since, they are already available to the attacker. The attacker knows
about few samples from U which constitutes his set of known samples K. Moreover, he
also has access to the euclidean distance relation function Fψ. The target record rE is
assumed to be located anywhere inside U and is denoted by the identifier E. The aim of
the attacker is to infer about the private attributes of rE given the information above.
Initially, we divide the data space into uniform m-dimensional grids. Each grid has a
total of 2m corners. Let a corner of the grid G be denoted by cj , where j = 1, . . . , 2m. We
sequentially iterate over all these grids once and check if a pair of known sample votes to
prune it. A grid is removed immediately from the search space if a single pair of known
sample polls to prune it.
In algorithm 1 we prune according to the observations mentioned in the previous
section. On lines 3 − 4 we implement observation 1 and on lines 5 − 6 we implement
observation 2. These observations require a comparison to be made between the distances
δ(rA, rE) and δ(rB, rE) followed by a call to function GridInHalfSpace which we discuss
shortly. Then, on lines 8 − 9 we apply observation 4 and on lines 10 − 11 we apply
observation 5 with calls to functions GridInSphere and GridOutOfSphere, respectively.
Note that lines 8 − 11 repeat twice to apply observation 4 and 5 on the hypersphere that
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Figure 4.2: A dataspace showing the weakest corner (marked by a dot)c of three grids in
R2.
are centered at rA and rB, respectively. If a grid satisfies any of these observations we
remove it immediately from the search space. After repeating this algorithm on all grids,
the final output of the attack is a small subset of grids that are unpruned, and thus, may
contain rE .
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Algorithm 1 Prunes a grid using relation function and known samples
Input: U : denotes the data space ,
G ⊆ U : a grid and its boundaries,
Fψ: euclidean distance relation function of the original data,
K = {r1, .., rt|ri ∈ U}: set of known samples,
E: an identifier to denote the target record rE .
Output: (True ∪ False): determines whether a grid would be pruned or not.
0: function PRUNEGRID(G,Fψ, K,E)
1: c← 0
2: for each pair (rA, rB) ∈ K do
3: if Fψ((rA, rE), (rB, rE)) = −1 then
4: if GridInHalfSpace(G, rB, rA) then return True
5: else if Fψ((rA, rE), (rB, rE)) = 1 then
6: if GridInHalfSpace(G, rA, rB) then return True
7: for each (r1, r2) ∈ {(rA, rB), (rB, rA)} do
8: if Fψ((r1, r2), (r1, rE)) = −1 then
9: if GridInSphere(G, r1, r2) then return True
10: else if Fψ((r1, r2), (r1, rE)) = 1 then
11: if GridOutOfSphere(G, r1, r2) then return True
12: return False
Grid in Half Space
On line 4 we verify that if a grid lies completely in the half-space PrB . As mentioned
before, trivial approach to verify that G is fully contained in PrB is to check if δ(cj, rA) >
δ(cj, rB) for all j. This would take 2m+1 euclidean distance calculations, since we will
calculate twice for each cj . Similarly, on line 6 we check if a grid lies completely in the
half-space PrA . This verification would again take 2m+1 euclidean distance calculations.
This approach is problematic since it requires an exponential amount of computations and
thus, is impractical for high dimensional data. In order to deal with this issue, we now
introduce an efficient approach to identify the location of G relative to PrA and PrB .
Definition 1 (Weakest Corner). Given a grid and its boundaries G = {(g1min, g1max), . . . ,
(gmmin, g
m
max)}, halfspace Pr1 formed by hyperplaneHr1r2 . The weakest corner c ofG with
respect to Pr1 is defined as:
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c[i] =
g
i
min if g
i
min · (r1[i]− r2[i]) < gimax · (r1[i]− r2[i])
gimax otherwise
(4.1)
Where i = 1, . . . ,m denotes the private attribute index.
Definition 2 (Weaker neighbour). Given half space Pr1 , for any corner in grid c′, we say
another corner c is a weaker neighbour of c′ and write c′ >> c if and only if c and c′
differ only in dimension α such that c[α] = c[α], c′[α] 6= c[α], and c[i] = c′[i] for all
i 6= α.
Given half space Pr1 , let c and c′ be two corners such that c′ >> c. Then, if c is in
Pr1 , then so is c′.
Proof. If c is in Pr1 , c is closer to r1 than r2. Thus, ∆c = δ(c, r1) − δ(c, r2) < 0.
Substituting the definition of δ, we have
∆c = Σi(r1[i]− c[i])2 − Σi(r2[i]− c[i])2
= φ+ (r1[α]− c[α])2 − (r2[α]− c[α])2
= φ+ (r1[α]− r2[α]) · (r1[α] + r2[α]− 2c[α])
where φ = Σi 6=α(r1[i]− c[i])2 − Σi 6=α(r2[i]− c[i])2. Similarly,
∆c′ = φ+ (r1[α]− r2[α]) · (r1[α] + r2[α]− 2c′[α])
We are interested in the sign of the difference between ∆c′ and ∆c:
∆c′ −∆c = 2(r1[α]− r2[α]) · (c[α]− c′[α])
We consider two cases separately. First, assume that r1[α] − r2[α] > 0. In this case, by
Definition 1, we have c[α] = gimin and c
′[α] = gimax. We now also have ∆c′ − ∆c < 0.
Given that ∆c < 0, we get ∆c′ < 0 as well.
Now we consider the case r1[α] − r2[α] ≤ 0. By Definition 1, we have c[α] = gimax
and c′[α] = gimin. This again gives ∆c′ −∆c ≤ 0.
Since in both cases, we have ∆c′ −∆c ≤ 0 given ∆c < 0 Thus, ∆c′ < 0 as well. c′ is
in Pr1 .
Given half space Pr1 , let c′ be any corner that is not the weakest corner. Then, if c is
in Pr1 , then so is c′.
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Proof. If c′ >> c, then the proof follows from Lemma 4.2.2. If not there exists a series
of corners c′, c1, . . . , ck, c for (k ∈ [1 − (n − 1)]) such that ck >> c, ci >> ci+1 (i ∈
[1− (k − 1)]), and c′ >> c1. Proof follows by applying Lemma 4.2.2 at each step.
Theorem 1. A grid G lies completely in halfspace Pr1 if and only if the weakest corner c
of G with respect to Pr1 lies in Pr1 .
Proof. (→) If the corner c ofG is not in Pr1 , obviouslyG cannot be said to be completely
within Pr1 .
(←) If c lie within Pr1 , by Lemma 4.2.2, all corners lie within Pr1 . Since the space Pr1
andG does not have any curved hyperplane side, we conclude thatG is completely within
Pr1 .
To check if a grid is completely inside a half-space compare δ(c, r1) and δ(c, r2).
Algorithm 2 shows our approach to identify the location of a grid G with respect to a
hyperplane Hr1r2 . That is, whether G is located in half-space Pr1 or Pr2 . The main idea
is to compute the weakest corner c of G relative to Pr1 (lines 3 − 4) and then compare
the distances δ(c, r1) and δ(c, r2) (line 5). By Theorem 1, G completely resides in Pr1 if
δ(c, r1) < δ(c, r2). Otherwise, it means that some portion of G is either located on Hr1r2
or inside Pr2 . The same procedure can be repeated for checking that G lies completely
inside Pr2 . However, in this case corner c is computed relative to Pr2 .
This approach is further exemplified in fig. 4.2 (2-dimensions). Our goal is to identify
if grids G1, G2 and G3 lie in Pr1 . The corner c for G2 can be calculated as follows:
c[1] = 1 since the inequality in eq. 4.1 equals 2 > −2 and c[2] = −3 since the inequality
in eq. 4.1 equals 10 > 6. Thus, the corner c = (1,−3) for G2. Now the next step is to
check if c is closer to r1 than it is to r2. Since δ(c, r1) = 2.82 > δ(c, r2) = 2 we can
conclude that G2 is not fully contained in Pr1 . This is also evident in the figure as the
right portion of G2 is located inside Pr2 . We have marked the weakest corner of these
three grids in the figure. By doing similar calculations on the remaining grids one can
determine that only G1 is completely contained in Pr1 .
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Algorithm 2 Checks if a grid is located in the specified half-space.
Input: G = {(g1min, g1max), . . . , (gmmin, gmmax)}: a grid and its boundaries,
r1, r2: denotes the two known points.
Output: (True ∪ False): determines if the grid lies in the half-space Pr1 .
0: function GRIDINHALFSPACE(G, r1, r2)
1: c[i]← 0; i = 1, 2, . . . ,m
2: Build the equidistant hyperplane Hr1r2 resulting in open half-spaces Pr1 , Pr2
3: for i = 1 to m do
4: if gimin · (r1[i]− r2[i]) < gimax · (r1[i]− r2[i]) then ci = gimin else ci = gimax
5: if δ(c, r1) < δ(c, r2) then return True else return False
Grid in Hypersphere
In algorithm 1, we verify that a grid G lies completely inside and outside of the hy-
persphere Sr1,δ(r1,r2) on lines 9 and 11, respectively. The trivial approach would be to
compare the distances δ(cj, r1) and δ(r1, r2) for all j. In the case we want to verify
that G lies completely inside Sr1,δ(r1,r2), then for each of the j corners the condition
δ(cj, r1) < δ(r1, r2) needs to be satisfied. That is, we make sure that each corner of
G lies within the radius of Sr1,δ(r1,r2). On the other hand, if we want to verify that G is
fully outside Sr1,δ(r1,r2), it will require the inequality δ(cj, r1) > δ(r1, r2) to hold for all
j. In other words, we make sure that each cj is lying outside Sr1,δ(r1,r2). Since both of
these techniques require 2m euclidean distance calculation, it is not a practical solution
and necessitates a higher execution time.
In order to deal with this issue, We introduce an efficient way to localize a grid relative
to a hypersphere. Our approach encompasses finding the farthest corner of G relative to
the center r1 of Sr1,δ(r1,r2). Then G is contained fully inside Sr1,δ(r1,r2), if the farthest cor-
ner lies inside Sr1,δ(r1,r2). We formally define the farthest corner in the following theorem.
Definition 3 (Farthest Corner). Given a grid and its boundaries G =
{(g1min, g1max), . . . , (gmmin, gmmax)} and a hypersphere Sr1,δ(r1,r2) with center r1 and radius
δ(r1, r2). We define the farthest corner f of G with respect to r1 as follows:
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f[i] =

gimin if r
i
1 > g
i
max
gimax if r
i
1 < g
i
min
p[i] otherwise
Where pi is defined as follows:
p[i] =
g
i
min if |r1[i]− gimin| > |r1[i]− gimax|
gimax otherwise
Definition 4 (Farther neighbour). Given a center point r and a grid G, we say a point
p ∈ G is a farther neighbour of p′ ∈ G and write p′ >◦ p if and only if p and p′ differ
only in dimension α such that p[α] = f[α], p′[α] 6= f[α], and p[i] = p′[i] for all i 6= α.
Given r and G, if p′ >◦ p on α then δ(p, r) > δ(p′, r).
Proof. We analyze the sign of the difference ∆p,p′ = δ(p, r)− δ(p′, r). Note that
∆p,p′ = (p[α]− r[α])2 − (p′[α]− r[α])2
Also note that ∆p,p′ > 0 if and only if |p[α] − r[α]| > |p′[α] − r[α]|. We consider three
cases.
First, if r[α] > gαmax, by Definition 3, p[α] = g
α
min and we have
|p[α]− r[α]| = r[α]− gαmax + gαmax − gαmin
Since p′ is in G, gαmin < p
′[α] ≤ gαmax. Thus,
|p′[α]− r[α]| = r[α]− gαmax + gαmax − p′[α]
< r[α]− gαmax + gαmax − gαmin
< p[α]− r[α]|
Second, if r[α] < gαmin, by Definition 3, p[α] = g
α
max and we have
|p[α]− r[α]| = gαmin − r[α] + gαmax − gαmin.
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Similarly, since p′ is in G, gαmin ≤ p′[α] < gαmax. Thus,
|p′[α]− r[α]| = gαmin − r[α] + p′[α]− gαmin
< gαmin − r[α] + gαmax − gαmin
< |p[α]− r[α]|
Third, suppose gαmin ≤ r[α] ≤ gαmax and gαmax − r[α] > r[α]− gαmax. By Definition 3,
p[α] = gαmax.
If gαmin ≤ p′[α] ≤ r[α], we have
|p′[α]− r[α]| = r[α]− p′[α]
≤ gαmin − p′[α]
< gαmax − r[α]
< |p[α]− r[α]|
If r[α] < p′[α] < gαmax, we have
|p′[α]− r[α]| = p′[α]− r[α]
< gαmax − r[α]
< |p[α]− r[α]|
The proof for the last case is similar to the previous case, thus omitted for brevity.
Given r and G, δ(f, r) ≥ δ(p′, r) for all points p′ ∈ G.
Proof. Proof is similar to the inductive proof of Lemma 4.2.2 and omitted for brevity.
Theorem 2. Given a gridG and a hypersphere Sr1,d, G completely lies within Sr1,d if and
only if δ(r1, f) ≤ d.
Proof. By Lemma 4.2.2, for all points p ∈ G, δ(r1, p) ≤ δ(r1, f). Thus, by definition of
hyperspehere, if δ(r1, f) ≤ d, all points of G resides in Sr1,d.
More efficient since it requires only one Euclidean distance calculation.
Algorithm 3 shows our implementation for checking if a grid lies inside a hypersphere.
On lines 3−9, we find the farthest corner f of the grid. On line 10, we check if the distance
δ(f, r1) is less than radius δ(r1, r2) of the hypersphere. That is, we make sure that G is
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Figure 4.3: A dataspace showing the farthest corner and closest point, with respect to rA,
of four grids by square and circular marker, respectively.
located completely inside Sr1,δ(r1,r2). We repeat the same procedure to find that if G lies
inside the hyperplane Sr2,δ(r1,r2). But this time f is calculated relative to r2. Note that our
method is fast and efficient, since it only requires one euclidean distance calculation.
Algorithm 3 Checks if a grid is located fully inside a hypersphere.
Input: G = {(g1min, g1max), . . . , (gmmin, gmmax)}: a grid and its boundaries,
r1, r2: denotes the two known points
Output: (True ∪ False): determines if a grid lies fully inside the hypersphere.
0: function GRIDINSPHERE(G, r1, r2)
1: f[i]← 0; i = 1, 2, . . . ,m
2: Build the hypersphere Sr1,δ(r1,r2)
3: for i = 1 to m do
4: if r1[i] > gimax then
5: f[i] = gimin
6: else if r1[i] < gimin then
7: f[i] = gimax
8: else
9: if |r1[i]− gimin| > |r1[i]− gimax| then f[i] = gimin else f[i] = gimax
10: if δ(f, r1) ≤ δ(r1, r2) then return True
11: return False
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Grid Outside of Hypersphere
Our approach to find that G lies completely outside of Sr1,δ(r1,r2) incorporates finding the
closest point on the surface of G relative to the center r1. This point includes all the
points on the surface of G including the corners. The central idea here is that if this point
is located outside Sr1,δ(r1,r2), it guarantees that entire G is located outside Sr1,δ(r1,r2). We
formally propose a means to find this closest point in the following theorem.
Definition 5 (Grid outside a hypersphere). Given a grid and its boundaries G =
{(g1min, g1max), . . . , (gmmin, gmmax)} and a hypersphere Sr1,δ(r1,r2) with center r1 and radius
δ(r1, r2). We define the closest point p on G with respect to r1 as follows:
p[i] =

gimax if r1[i] > g
i
max
gimin if r1[i] < g
i
min
r1[i] otherwise
Definition 6 (Closer neighbour). Given a center point r and a grid G, we say a point
p ∈ G is a closer neighbour of p′ ∈ G and write p′ <◦ p if and only if p and p′ differ only
in dimension α such that p[α] = p[α], p′[α] 6= p[α], and p[i] = p′[i] for all i 6= α.
Given r and G, if p′ <◦ p on α then δ(p, r) < δ(p′, r).
Proof. We analyze the sign of the difference ∆p,p′ = δ(p, r) − δ(p′, r). Note that, as
before, ∆p,p′ < 0 if and only if |p′[α]− r[α]| > |p[α]− r[α]|. We consider three cases.
First, if r[α] > gαmax, by Definition 3, p[α] = g
α
max and we have
|p[α]− r[α]| = r[α]− gαmax
Since p′ is in G, gαmin < p
′[α] ≤ gαmax. Thus,
|p′[α]− r[α]| = r[α]− gαmax + gαmax − p′[α]
> r[α]− gαmax
> |p[α]− r[α]|
Second, if r[α] < gαmin, by Definition 3, p[α] = g
α
min and we have
|p[α]− r[α]| = gαmin − r[α].
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Similarly, since p′ is in G, gαmin ≤ p′[α] < gαmax. Thus,
|p′[α]− r[α]| = gαmin − r[α] + p′[α]− gαmin
> gαmin − r[α]
> |p[α]− r[α]|
Third, if gαmin ≤ r[α] ≤ gαmax, by Definition 3, p[α] = r[α]. Note that |p[α]−r[α]| = 0.
Since p′[α]! = r[α], |p′[α]− r[α]| > |p[α]− r[α]| holds.
Given r and G, δ(p, r) ≤ δ(p′, r) for all points p′ ∈ G.
Proof. Proof is similar to the inductive proof of Lemma 4.2.2 and omitted for brevity.
Theorem 3. Given a grid G and a hypersphere Sr1,d, G completely lies outside of Sr1,d if
and only if δ(r1,p) ≥ d.
Proof. By Lemma 4.2.2, for all points p ∈ G, δ(r1, p) ≥ δ(r1,p). Thus, by definition of
hyperspehere, if δ(r1,p) ≥ d, all points of G lies outside of Sr1,d.
Algorithm 4 shows our implementation to verify thatG lies completely outside Sr1,δ(r1,r2).
On lines 3 − 9, we find the point p on G that lies closest to r1. On line 10, we compare
δ(p, r1) with the radius δ(r1, r2) of Sr1,δ(r1,r2). The true output to this inequality indicates
that p is located inside Sr1,δ(r1,r2), thus we can conclude that G is not entirely located
outside Sr1,δ(r1,r2). On the other hand, a false value indicates that p is located outside
Sr1,δ(r1,r2) and hence, G is also positioned completely outside Sr1,δ(r1,r2).
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Algorithm 4 Checks if a grid is located fully outside a hypersphere.
Input: G = {(g1min, g1max), . . . , (gmmin, gmmax)}: a grid and its boundaries,
r1, r2: denotes the two known points
Output: (True ∪ False): determines if a grid lies fully outside the hypersphere.
0: function GRIDOUTOFSPHERE(G, r1, r2)
1: p[i]← 0; i = 1, 2, . . . ,m
2: Build the hypersphere Sr1,δ(r1,r2)
3: for i = 1 to m do
4: if r1[i] > gimax then
5: p[i] = gimax
6: else if r1[i] < gimin then
7: p[i] = gimin
8: else
9: p[i] = r1[i]
10: if δ(p, r1) ≤ δ(r1, r2) then return False
11: return True
Our technique to find the closest point and farthest corner of a grid is further exempli-
fied in fig. 4.3. This fig. shows four grids G1, G2, G3 and G4 with their respective closest
point and farthest corner marked on them by a circular and a square marker, respectively.
For G1, G2 and G3 closest point with respect to r1 is distinctly located on their corners.
However, closest point for G4 lies on the center of its width towards the left of r1. One
can verify that among all the grids farthest corner of G3 lies inside Sr1,δ(r1,r2) thus, only
G3 lies completely inside this circle. On the contrary, G1 and G1 are positioned outside
Sr1,δ(r1,r2) since, their respective closest points are located outside Sr1,δ(r1,r2).
4.3 Attack in Ranking Space
In section 4.2 we addressed a sub-problem in which an adversary had a set of known
samples and the euclidean distance relation function Fψ. We now formulate a strategy to
apply algorithm 1 in our problem domain.
We assume that an attacker has a set of known samples K and the rank relation func-
tion Fγ , then the aim of the attacker is to infer about the private attributes of the target
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record rE . Note that since, Fγ is a noisy variant of Fψ attacker cannot directly apply
algorithm 1 in this setting. That is, algorithm 1 is not resilient to noise because it removes
a grid immediately when a pair of known sample votes to prune it. As a result, attacker
might end up pruning wrong grids or in the worst case the entire search space without
inferring anything about rE . Thus, it becomes crucial for him to estimate a correct value
for V .
In algorithm 1, for each pair of known sample (rA, rB) we make three queries to the
rank relation function which are as follows: Fγ((rA, rE), (rB, rE)),Fγ((rA, rB), (rA, rE))
and Fγ((rA, rB), (rB, rE)). We use the set K to generate outputs of Fψ and Fγ for these
queries since we know the ranks and the private attribute values for each ri ∈ K. Then,
we make a comparison between the output of Fγ and Fψ to measure the amount of noise
in Fγ .
Definition 7 (Probability of error). Given the set of known samples rA, rB ∈ K, the target
point rE , the output of rank relation function Fγ and euclidean distance relation function
Fψ on the queriesFλ((rA, rE), (rB, rE)),Fλ((rA, rB), (rA, rE)) andFλ((rA, rB), (rB, rE))
and let E denote the number of mismatches between the output of Fγ and Fψ for these
queries, then, we define the probability of error PE in the output of Fγ as follows:
PE =
E
3 · (|K|
2
)
Where
(|K|
2
)
denotes the number of unique pairs of known samples.
In order to calculate the actual value of PE, we must know the output of euclidean
distance relation functionFψ for the queries mentioned in definition 7 including the target
point rE and the known points rA, rB ∈ K. In our case, though it this is not possible to
determine PE because finding the output of Fψ requires the knowledge of the distances
δ(rA, rE) and δ(rB, rE). That is, we don’t assume that the attacker knows the distances
between the known and target points. Thus, we try to estimate a value for PE using only
the set of known samples.
Let r1, r2, r3 ∈ K be our identifier for known samples. In definition 7, we initially
set rA = r1, rB = r2 and rE = r3, and calculate the value of PE. Note that number of
known samples in this case equal
(|K|−1
2
)
as we are assuming that one of the known point
is a target. We repeat the same process for all (r1, r2) ∈ K \ r3 by fixing rE = r3. This
30
step repeats for a total of
(|K|−1
2
)
times. Since, rE can take |K| values we find a total of
|K|(|K|−1
2
)
values of PE. Thus, the average value of probability of error Pavg is given by:
Pavg =
1
|K|(|K|−1
2
) · |K|(|K|−12 )∑
i=1
PEi
Table 4.1: Distance matrix of five records from hospital dataset
r1 r2 r3 r4 r5
r1 0 35.0 70.4 24.9 28.5
r2 35.0 0 37.2 13.7 57.8
r3 70.4 37.2 0 46.0 93.1
r4 24.9 13.7 46.0 0 48.2
r5 28.5 57.8 93.1 48.2 0
(a) Euclidean distance matrix
R1 R2 R3 R4 R5
R1 0 2 3 1 1
R2 2 0 1 1 3
R3 3 1 0 2 4
R4 1 1 2 0 2
R5 1 3 4 2 0
(b) Rank distance matrix
As an example, consider table 4.1. The attacker has access to three records r2, r3
and r4, which comprises the set K, along with the rank relation matrix shown in ta-
ble 4.1(b). The goal of the attacker is to predict the private attributes of r5. Since, the
attacker knows that rank relations may have some noise as compared to the actual dis-
tance relations, he proceeds to calculate Pavg using only the set K. He initially sets
rA = r2, rB = r3 and rE = r4, then using the rank relation matrix from table 4.1(b)
Fγ((r2, r4), (r3, r4)) = −1, Fγ((r2, r3), (r2, r4)) = 0 and Fγ((r2, r3), (r3, r4)) = −1.
The attacker knows the attribute values for known records so he can generate euclidean
distance matrix for ri ∈ K as shown in table 4.1(a). Using this information he finds the
euclidean distance relations given by Fψ((r2, r4), (r3, r4)) = −1, Fψ((r2, r3), (r2, r4)) =
1 and Fψ((r2, r3), (r3, r4)) = −1. Since, there is one mismatch between outputs of Fγ
and Fψ, the value of PE = 1/3. Using similar calculations PE can be calculated for the
remaining values of rE (i.e., r2 and r3). One can determine that Pavg = 1/3 using all
values of PE.
Algorithm 4.1 is not resilient to noise in output of relation function. Using it with rank
relation function Fλ alone may lead to over-pruning, since Fλ are noisy. For example,
let the known pair (rA, rB) decides to prune a grid X while searching for the target rE .
Algorithm 4.1 will immediately prune X from the search space and proceed to the next
grid. This may be problematic since rank relations Fλ are noisy and thus, (rA, rB)’s
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decision to prune X could be wrong.
The noise in rank relations follow a randomized response model [20]. That is, we
can also alternatively generate Fλ by adding noise to euclidean distance relation function
using a randomized response model. In order to deal with this noise, we implement a
voting mechanism. For each grid, we count the the number of unique known pairs which
have voted in the favour of pruning that grid. If the vote for pruning a particular grid
is greater than or equal to an input voting threshold V then we prune that grid from the
search space. That is, we have a total of
(|K|
2
)
known pairs, if at least V of these known
pairs decide to prune a grid X then we remove it from the search space. We use the
following heuristic function to find the voting threshold V .
V = C · Pavg · 3 ·
(|K| − 1
2
)
Where C ∈ (0, 1] denotes the normalization constant. Its value is dependant on the
correlation coefficient of the set of known samples. The above equation is multiplied by
3 owing to the fact that we are making three queries to the relation function per known
pair.
Algorithm 5 shows our implementation for pruning grids with a voting mechanism.
This algorithm is similar to Algorithm 1 in the sense that it also implements the obser-
vations 1,2,4 and 5, however, we don’t immediately prune a grid when an observation
is satisfied. Instead If a grid satisfies any of these observations we increment a voting
counter c and on line 12 we compare it with the voting threshold. A grid is pruned if a
c ≥ V , i.e. V or more pair of known samples votes to prune it from the search space.
After repeating this algorithm on all grids, the final output of the attack is a small subset
of grids that are unpruned, thus, may contain rE .
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Algorithm 5 Prunes a grid using relation function and known samples
Input: U : denotes the data space ,
G ⊆ U : a grid and its boundaries,
Fγ: rank relation function of the original data,
K = {r1, .., rt|ri ∈ U}: set of known samples,
E: an identifier to denote the target record rE ,
V : a voting threshold.
Output: (True ∪ False): determines whether a grid would be pruned or not.
0: function PRUNEGRIDONVOTE(G,Fγ, K,E, V )
1: c← 0
2: for each pair (rA, rB) ∈ K do
3: if Fγ((rA, rE), (rB, rE)) = −1 then
4: if GridInHalfSpace(G, rB, rA) then c← c+ 1
5: else if Fγ((rA, rE), (rB, rE)) = 1 then
6: if GridInHalfSpace(G, rA, rB) then c← c+ 1
7: for each (r1, r2) ∈ {(rA, rB), (rB, rA)} do
8: if Fγ((r1, r2), (r1, rE)) = −1 then
9: if GridInSphere(G, r1, r2) then c← c+ 1
10: else if Fγ((r1, r2), (r1, rE)) = 1 then
11: if GridOutOfSphere(G, r1, r2) then c← c+ 1
12: if c > V then return True
13: return False
4.4 Multi-granularity grid pruning
In algorithm 1 we assumed that the data space is divided into m-dimensional uniform
grids. Decreasing the size of the grid would mean an increase in the total number of
grids, and hence, it would result in a finer granularity. This would increase the efficiency
of our attack since, we would be pruning more region from the data space. However, this
approach requires processing higher number of grids and thus, leads to a higher execution
time.
To improve the performance of our attack, we propose a multi-granularity grid based
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Figure 4.4: A binary tree structure containing the remaining grids, grey grids are the ones
removed from the search space (and the tree).
approach. We initially treat the entire universe U as a single grid and then iteratively keep
on dividing the grid across its dimensions until a suitable granularity level is achieved.
The main idea here is to prune larger grids from the search space for the purpose of de-
creasing the total amount of grids processed. Note that our algorithms (2, 3 and 4) for
checking the location of a grid relative to a hypersphere and a hyperplane are indepen-
dent of the size of a grid since, they only require corners of a grid to perform correctly.
Thus, pruning larger grids from the search space increases the performance of our attack
algorithm.
We present our multi-granularity grid based pruning technique in Algorithm 6. The
inputs to this algorithm are similar to the inputs of Algorithm 1 apart from an additional
binary tree structure denoted by btree and an identifier MinLen to denote the minimum
length of a grid. MinLen is used to determine the granularity of the grids across all the
dimensions. That is, a grid is repeatedly divided into half across its ith dimension until the
minimum grid length across ith dimension equals MinLen[i].
Our algorithm works in recursive manner. Initially, node of the binary tree, denoted
by node, is assigned the entire universe in a form of a m-dimensional grid. On lines 1−2,
we fetch the grid G from the current node and get the depth of G in the tree. Let the
depth of the G be denoted by dim. We proceed to divide G equally across dim into two
grids namely, GA and GB. On line 4, we make sure that GAs’ length across dim has not
reached the allowed minimum length, if this is the case we continue. Note that since, GA
and GB have equal lengths for dim checking the length of one of the grid suffices here.
On lines 5− 7, we run our Algorithm 1 to check if GA would be pruned from the search
space. if GA is not pruned it is inserted as the left child of the node otherwise, we prune
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it from the search space. The same process is repeated for GB, it is inserted as the right
child of the node only if it is not removed from the search space. On lines 7 and 10, we
recursively call our algorithm with the newly created left and right child nodes. In the
next iteration, we divide GA and GB across dim+1 and same process repeats for the new
grids. Our algorithm terminates only when the length of the grids, belonging to the leaf
nodes, is reduced to MinLen.
Algorithm 6 Initiates the attack algorithm by utilizing the binary tree structure.
Input: U : denotes the data space ,
btree: denotes the binary tree data structure,
node ∈ btree.nodes: a node in binary tree containing a grid,
Fγ: rank relations of the original data,
K = {r1, .., rt|ri ∈ U}: set of known samples,
E: an identifier to denote the target record rE ,
V : a voting threshold,
MinLen: minimum grid length allowed.
Output: returns a binary tree with remaining grids having a granularity of at least
MinLen.
0: function INSERTBTREE(node)
1: G = node.boundaries
2: dim = node.depth mod m
3: Create grids GA and GB by dividing grid G w.r.t. dim
4: if len(GA[dim]) < MinLen[dim] then return
5: if ¬PruneGridOnV ote(GA,Fγ, K,E, V ) then
6: node.insertLeft(GA)
7: InsertBTree(node.getLeftNode)
8: if ¬PruneGridOnV ote(GB,Fγ, K,E, V ) then
9: node.insertRight(GB)
10: InsertBTree(node.getRightNode)
Our multi-granularity grid based pruning approach is exemplified in Figure 4.4. The
database has two private attribute A1 and A2 and their domains Ω(A1) = Ω(A1) = 0 −
100. The figure present the grids labeled by their respective boundaries. The root grid (top
most) comprises the entire data space. The two grids at depth 1 are formed by dividing
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the root grid across the A1 dimension. These grids are further split into two by dividing
them across the A2 dimension, as evident at depth 2. Note that the greyed out grids are
the ones which are pruned from the search space and they are not inserted in the tree. The
process of splitting the grids continue until a preset granularity level is reached.
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Chapter 5
Experimental Evaluation
In order to demonstrate efficiency of our attack, we test our algorithm on one real-
world and two synthetic datasets. We have full control over the ranking function in all the
three datasets.
One practical application of our attack is as follows. At a particular university, by
the end of the semester, instructor after grading all the homeworks, exams and projects
publishes student rankings based on their accumulative grade. Though student ranking
is not published in all the universities, some still prefer this amount of disclosure. The
attacker in this case is a student who is aware of his and a few close friends’ grades in
all the assessments and this composes his set of known samples. The aim of the attacker
is then, to infer the grades of a remaining students in all the assessments by utilizing the
set of known samples and the ranking information. Since other students are not in his
social circle, he may not be able to ask them directly. Inspired by this scenario, we utilize
one real-world dataset and two synthetic datasets, with 8 private attributes each, in our
experiments.
Students dataset: We collected anonymized data of 105 students from a undergrad-
uate level course containing grades of student in home works, midterm exam, project and
final exam. Each record has 8 private attributes and 1 public attribute. Ranking of the stu-
dents is determined by the weighted average function, from equation ??, with the weights
for each private attribute set to 0.125. Table 5.1 shows the domain of each private attribute
in the dataset.
Synthetic dataset: We generated two synthetic datasets, containing 100 records each,
from a Gaussian distribution. Each record has 8 private and 1 public attribute. We differ-
entiate the two datasets based on their correlation coefficient among the private attributes.
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Table 5.1: Private attributes of students data with their respective domains
Private attribute Ω(Ai)
Homework 1 0− 5
Final 0− 35
Midterm 0− 30
Homework 2 0− 5
Homework 3 0− 5
Homework 4 0− 5
Project Presentation 0− 5
Project Report 0− 10
One dataset has a high average correlation coefficient of 0.93, whereas the other has a low
correlation coefficient given by 0.38. We utilize ranking function from equation 2.1 with
weight for each private attribute set to 0.125. Both datasets have a similar a domain of all
the private attributes given by Ω(Ai) = (0− 100).
We run our grid-based algorithm from section 4.4 on these three datasets. We divide
the entire data space such that each dimension is split into 8 parts. Thus, we have grid
volume of 1.95 for students dataset and approximately 596M for synthetic dataset. We
believe that with such granularity of grid it is reasonable to assume that target can be
located efficiently considering the data space is large. With such a grid volume, we have a
total of 16M uniform grids for all datasets. However, due to our efficient multi-granularity
implementation, we process fairly lower number of grids.
5.1 Expected distance per dimension
We measure the performance of our attack using the following quantitative metrics.
The transcriptA(U,Fγ, K,E, V ) = U ′ is used to denote the attack, where (U,Fλ, K,E, V )
are the input parameters as explained in algorithm 6 and U ′ contains the remaining grids
after attack algorithm terminates. In other words, U ′ represents the portion of the search
space where the attack claims target record rE is located.
Our first metric is the expected distance that captures the error of our estimation for
each dimension. The output of the attack U ′ contains the remaining grids after pruning
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U . We use U ′ to construct a histogram which contains the frequency information of the
grid boundaries across each dimension. Let the grid with the highest frequency across
each dimension be denoted by T and let f [i] denote its frequency across ith dimension.
The attacker assumes that target point rE is located inside T . To calculate the expected
distance per dimension from rE , we use the formula:
Expecteddistance[i] =
f [i]
# of grids in U ′
· ∣∣µ(T [i])− rE[i]∣∣
where i = 1, . . . ,m and µ(T [i]) denotes the center of grid boundary across the ith
dimension. We compare the results of our attack with the baseline knowledge that can be
inferred about the target record using the set of known points. Given the known points
rA ∈ K, we define the baseline for expected distance per dimension BE as follows:
BE[i] =
∑
rA∈K
∣∣rE[i]− rA[i]∣∣
|K|
5.2 Overall distance
Our second metric is the overall distance. It aims to measure the normalized L2-norm
between our estimation and the target record. Given the grid T , target record rE and
the maximum distance allowed by the boundaries of the data space η(U), we define the
overall distance in the following expression:
dist =
δ(µ(T ), rE)
η(U)
Where µ(T ) denotes the central point of the grid T . Given the known points rA ∈ K,
our baseline for overall distance BO is given by the following equation:
BO =
∑
rA∈K δ(rA, rE)
η(U) · |K|
Note that we normalize the actual distance and its baseline by η(U) so that results
remain comparable across multiple datasets.
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5.3 Performance Ratio
It measures the performance of our multi-granularity grid based approach by generat-
ing a ratio of number of grids processed by our optimized approach to the number grids
processed by uniform grid approach. We set the minimum length MinLen[i] of our grid
for each dimension to range(Ω(Ai))/8 i.e., once our attack terminates we get grids that
have granularity of range(Ω(Ai))/8 for i = 1, . . . ,m. On the other hand, the uniform
grids approach with similar granularity has a total of approximately 16M grids. Given the
number of grids processed PG after our attack terminates, we define the ratio as follows:
Ratio =
PG
# of uniform grids
A lower performance ratio indicates our algorithm has processed lower number of
grids as compared to the uniform grid approach.
5.4 Results and Discussion
The most fascinating result of our attack is how the overall distance decreases as we
increase the number of known samples. This can be explained by the fact that as we
increase the number of known samples this leads to pruning more grids from the data
space. And once more grids are removed target record can be precisely located inside
the data space. Figure 5.1 shows the overall distance measured for our three datsets. Our
attack achieves a distance of less than 0.15 with 6 or more samples for the high correlated
and students dataset. Even with 3 samples, we achieve a distance of less than 0.18 for both
the datasets. Taking into account that 3-6 samples can be easily obtained (e.g., attackers’
record himself and 2-5 of his friends), we can say that our attack is realistic and practical.
The results for overall distance also suggest that we perform best for the highly corre-
lated data and worst for the low correlated data. For example, the value of distance with
K=10 for high correlated, students and low correlated datasets is given by 0.07, 0.13 and
0.27, respectively. The reason for this anomaly can be explained as follows: the amount
of differences in the output of Fγ and Fψ is highest for the low correlated data, and thus
it translates to a higher amount of probability of error PE. On the other hand, the value
of PE for high correlated data is lowest followed by the students data. When we compare
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the distance against the baseline with K=10, students dataset has the highest difference
of 0.21. This is because our baseline may increase or decrease depending on the location
of known point relative to the target point. An increase is expected if the known point is
positioned farther away from the target point. However, adding this new known to our
attack after 6 or more samples may only help in pruning few more grids since, most of the
grids are already pruned with known samples 3-6. Thus, this known has minimal affect
on the distance.
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Figure 5.1: Overall distance for K = 3, 4, 6, 8, 10
In Figure 5.2, we observe the expected distance per dimension for the final and midterm
attribute of student dataset for the same experiments as above. Both these attributes are
not varying much as we increase the number of knowns. These results reflect the re-
sults shown in Figure 5.1(a) since, expected distance is also calculated by assuming target
point is located inside the top grid T . The interesting outcome of this graph is that we are
producing lower expected distance for the final as compared to the midterm. For exam-
ple, with K = 6 the value of expected distance for final and midterm is 0.09 and 0.12,
respectively. The final attribute has the highest weightage in the ranking function since
domain of final is Ω(A2) = 0 − 35, which also means that ranking of the records are
primarily dictated by the final scores. As a result, expected distance is found to be lower
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for attributes having a higher weightage in the ranking function.
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Figure 5.2: Expected distance per dimension for the students dataset
The performance of a our algorithm is demonstrated in Figure 5.3. It is evident from
the figure that for all the three datasets we are always processing lower amount of grids
then we would otherwise in the case of uniform grids approach. For the high and low
correlated datasets with K = 3 the ratio is higher indicating that we are processing higher
number of grids. This can be explained by the fact that generally with lower number of
known samples we are not able to prune larger volume grids and thus it leads processing
a higher number of smaller volume grids. Whereas, as we increase the number of known
samples we prune more and more larger volume grids that results in processing lower
number of grids in total.
In Figure 5.3, student dataset is not following a similar trend. For example, the ratio
for K = 10 is higher than K = 3 showing that number of grids processed for K =
10 is higher then to the number of grids processed for K = 3. The number of grids
processed is also dependent on the location of known samples relative to the target point.
We may also prune large volume grids provided the following conditions are met: (i)
the known pair (rA, rB) is located close together such that δ(rA, rB) is small, then if
observation 5 holds all the grids completely outside the small hypersphere are pruned. (ii)
the known pair (rA, rB) is distant such that δ(rA, rB) is as large as possible. In this case, if
observation 4 holds all the grids completely inside the large hypersphere are pruned from
the search space. Since, we randomly select the target and the set of known samples,
we may end up pruning larger grids for lower number of known samples if the above
mentioned conditions are satisfied.
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Figure 5.3: Ratio of processed grids to the uniform grids for the three datasets
On the other hand, we may prune small volume of dataspace depending on the location
of the known samples and the target point. Consider the scenario in which pairs of known
samples (rA, rB) ∈ K are located close together, whereas target point is located farther
away from them. In this case each hypersphere centered on a known point rA will have
a small radius since δ(rA, rB) is small. Then, if observation 4 holds we would prune
only the grids contained completely inside this hypersphere. Thus, only small volume of
dataspace would be pruned which will result in limited to no inference about the private
attributes.
We make a comparison of our attack with the state of the art algorithm Q-point [8]. We
adjusted Q-point in way to make a fair comparison between the two algorithms. Firstly,
we set the top-K tuples to the number of records in the dataset. That is, each query to
Q-point returned all the tuples in the dataset ranked according to the ranking function
defined in the preliminaries. Secondly, we limited the number of queries generated to the
domain length of a particular private attribute that needs to be attacked. We discretized
our datasets in such a way that each private attribute can take one of the eight values.
Finally, we used our expected distance metric to compare the results generated by both
of the algorithms. In Figure 5.4, we show the results generated for student and high
correlated datasets. We make a comparison between 4 private attributes and the expected
distance reveals that our algorithm outperforms Q-point for all the attributes.
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Figure 5.4: A comparison between the results of our algorithm and Q-point
In Figure 5.5, we demonstrate the overall distance by varying the number of private
attributes for the student and the high correlated dataset. The results show that distance
doesn’t vary much as the number of private attributes are increased. For instance, distance
has a value of 0.13 with the number of private attributes set to 3 and 8, respectively for
the student dataset. Similar trend is also observed for the high correlated dataset.
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Figure 5.5: Varying the number of private attributes for the two datasets
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Chapter 6
Conclusion and Future Work
In this thesis, we formulated a technique to infer about the private attributes of an
unknown record assuming that we know about the private attribute values of few records
in that database along with the published rankings of all the tuples. Our technique is
based on a solving a simpler sub-problem in which an adversary has access to few known
samples and the euclidean distance relations of all the tuples in the database. We made a
comparison between rank relation and euclidean distance relations to estimate the amount
of noise in rankings. To make our attack on rankings resilient to noise we introduced a vot-
ing mechanism which was shown to effectively combat noise. In addition, we enhanced
the performance of our attack when dealing with high dimensional data by developing a
multi-granularity grid based algorithm.
Our results show that with moderate to low noise in rankings our attack can estimate
private attributes with a high accuracy using only few known samples. For example, we
achieve a normalized distance, with respect to a specific target record, of less then 0.18
using only 3 known samples. Moreover, our results show the performance of our multi-
granularity grid based approach as opposed to the naive uniform grid approach. For all
the three datasets, we process lower number of grids then we would have otherwise in the
case of uniform grid approach.
In future work, we plan to study potential defense approaches against our attack
such as K-ananymity, differentail privacy and fairness aware ranking. Some of these
approaches may provide resilience against our attack, however, how much resilience they
provide must be theoretically and empirically studied. In addition, we must consider the
trade-off between their overall utility degradation versus how much attack resilience they
will provide.
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We can also consider dynamic attacks in which, if we discover a target record with
very high confidence, we can add that to our list of known samples and in the next attack,
treat that record also as a known sample. This may help in locating the next target point
with high accuracy. Moreover, our attack can also be extended to trajectories dataset such
as vehicle gps trajectory and character trajectory. In this case, using our are set of known
samples we will try to predict the target trajectory and after some post-processing we may
deduce something more conclusive.
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Appendix A
Tabular results of evaluations on each
dataset
Table A.1: Evaluations of high correlated dataset
Knowns Voting threshold Runtime (sec)
Total uniform
grids
Processed grids Ratio Overall distance Baseline
3 1 2819.9 16777216 11931361 0.711 0.186 0.234
4 2 4302.4 16777216 8673090 0.5169 0.124 0.221
6 2 4884.2 16777216 4187478 0.249 0.126 0.224
8 3 1731.1 16777216 932737 0.0555 0.084 0.217
10 7 5376.7 16777216 1644230 0.098 0.074 0.215
Table A.2: Evaluations of student dataset
Knowns Voting threshold Runtime (sec)
Total uniform
grids
Processed grids Ratio Overall distance Baseline
3 1 1563.614 16777216 5677022 0.338 0.172 0.293
4 2 2921.47 16777216 5575661 0.332 0.162 0.300
6 8 13272.867 16777216 10375452 0.618 0.137 0.320
8 11 18195.019 16777216 7524162 0.448 0.135 0.356
10 16 24636.845 16777216 6479404 0.3862 0.134 0.343
47
Table A.3: Evaluations of low correlated dataset
Knowns Voting threshold Runtime (sec)
Total uniform
grids
Processed grids Ratio Overall distance Baseline
3 2 3779.2 16777216 15778529 0.9404 0.380 0.423
4 2 3687.1 16777216 7610548 0.4536 0.313 0.400
6 4 4192.92 16777216 3526026 0.2101 0.297 0.384
8 5 2395.62 16777216 1259020 0.075 0.285 0.394
10 10 9496.5 16777216 2920280 0.174 0.279 0.391
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